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When ‘environmentally friendly’ items are added to a set of conventional items, people
report that the total set will have a lower environmental impact even though the actual
impact increases. One hypothesis is that this “negative footprint illusion” arises because
people, who are susceptible to the illusion, lack necessary knowledge of the item’s
actual environmental impact, perhaps coupled with a lack of mathematical skills. The
study reported here addressed this hypothesis by recruiting participants (‘experts’) from
a master’s program in energy systems, who thus have bachelor degrees in energy-
related fields including academic training in mathematics. They were asked to estimate
the number of trees needed to compensate for the environmental burden of two
sets of buildings: one set of 150 buildings with conventional energy ratings and one
set including the same 150 buildings but also 50 ‘green’ (energy-efficient) buildings.
The experts reported that less trees were needed to compensate for the set with
150 conventional and 50 ‘green’ buildings compared to the set with only the 150
conventional buildings. This negative footprint illusion was as large in magnitude for
the experts as it was for a group of novices without academic training in energy-related
fields. We conclude that people are not immune to the negative footprint illusion even
when they have the knowledge necessary to make accurate judgments.
Keywords: averaging bias, judgment, environmental impact, climate change, negative footprint illusion
INTRODUCTION
Climate change is one of society’s great challenges (American Psychological Association, 2008;
Hansen et al., 2013). The scientific community agrees that human activity is to a large degree
responsible for these changes (Oreskes, 2005), reinforced by a range of psychological phenomena
including justification of environmentally irresponsible behavior with other credentials (Mazar and
Zhong, 2010), compensatory green beliefs (Kaklamanou et al., 2015) and rebound effects (Chitnis
et al., 2013). People travel for longer distances when driving a vehicle that uses a ‘sustainable’ energy
source; they purchase ‘organic’ food as a means to be environmentally friendly without necessarily
reducing other means of consumption; and those who deliberately change their behavior to more
environmentally friendly in one area often start behaving environmentally irresponsible in another.
Psychological science may not be able to stop climate change on its own (Gifford, 2011) but it can
help identify why and how people’s ability to make accurate environmental impact estimates of
their actions is biased (Sörqvist, 2016). Drawing from previous research (Holmgren et al., 2018),
this paper investigates whether the estimated environmental impact of a set of items is reduced
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when “green” objects are added to the set—a negative footprint
illusion. Specifically, the current study explores whether people
are immune to this illusion when they have the necessary
knowledge to make accurate estimates.
A large part of psychological research on erroneous ways of
reasoning has concerned probability judgment. This research
tradition has identified a large body of heuristics and biases
that influence judgments and often lead to inaccuracies (Tversky
and Kahneman, 1983; Gilovich et al., 2002; Isaac and Brough,
2014; Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier, 2015). Here, we apply these
concepts and methods on the study of people’s understanding of
environmental impact. Past studies with similar ambitions have
shown, for example, that people tend to rely on symbolically
significant information (Sütterlin and Siegrist, 2014) or other
irrelevant attributes such as object size (Cowen and Gatersleben,
2017) while neglecting other more important information when
judging energy use. People also have difficulty understanding
the stock-flow relationship of the CO2 accumulation in the
atmosphere (Newell et al., 2016); and they believe that
environmentally friendly actions and choices can compensate
for less sustainable behaviors (Kaklamanou et al., 2015). The
latter of these conceptions is called ‘compensatory green beliefs’
and may be one of the reasons for negative spillover of
pro-environmental behavior. Negative spillover occurs when
“one pro-environmental behavior decreases the likelihood of
additional pro-environmental behavior” (Truelove et al., 2014,
p. 128). For example, fuel efficiency is associated with increased
driving distance (Matiaske et al., 2012), the presence of a recycling
bin increases paper use compared to a control condition (Catlin
and Wang, 2012), and car owners of more environmentally
friendly cars drive more unethically compared to conventional
car owners (Norton, 2012). These negative spillover effects can
be linked to moral licensing whereby people justify immoral
behavior by establishing moral credentials (Mazar and Zhong,
2010). One possible explanation for this phenomenon – as
proposed by Sachdeva et al. (2009) – is that moral behavior
is inherently costly for the individual; hence they use moral
licensing to get back to a more comfortable state—that is, a
regression to the individual average of the ‘moral currency.’
Compensatory green beliefs are often associated with
behavior; the idea that the benefits of some behaviors can
compensate the costs of other behaviors. A similar phenomenon
has also been found in people’s tendency to think about the
costs and benefits of objects. Holmgren et al. (2018) showed
that people’s estimates of the environmental impact of a set of
conventional buildings are higher, compared to a set containing
the same number of conventional buildings in addition to a
number of “green” (energy efficient) buildings, as if the benefits
of the “green” buildings compensate for some of the costs of
the conventional buildings. Experimental evidence suggests that
an averaging process underpins this “negative footprint illusion,”
by which people base their estimates on the average rather than
the sum of the items in the set. We argue that this averaging
process is responsible for people’s tendency to think that the
addition of environmentally friendly objects compensates for the
negative impact of less friendly objects (Holmgren et al., 2018).
Further, we assume that the averaging bias has its roots in a
balancing heuristic shaped by natural selection to handled social
exchange between people (Sörqvist and Langeborg, unpublished).
The balancing heuristic is arguably designed to calculate the
moral balance in interpersonal relationships and works well when
applied to the problem it was designed to solve, but the same
principle leads to inaccuracies when applied to estimate the
environmental impact of objects and actions.
A negative footprint illusion has also been found in other
contexts. Gorissen and Weijters (2016) demonstrated the effect
in three experiments on estimates of the environmental impact
of food products. In one of their experiments, people rated a
hamburger together with an organic apple as having a lower
carbon footprint (i.e., environmental impact) compared to the
hamburger alone. Collectively, the studies on the negative
footprint illusion suggest that the effect influences estimates
generally and is not paradigm specific. It should be noted
though, that the effect has thus far only been found in between-
participants designs in which one group of participants make
the environmental impact estimates of the set with regular items
and another group of participants make the estimates of the set
with regular and “green” items. The illusion has not been shown
in within-participant designs where the same participants make
estimates of both sets and thus can compare their own estimates
of the two. Finding a negative footprint illusion in a within-
participant design is both theoretically and methodologically
relevant, however, because it would suggest that people are
not immune to the illusion when they compare their estimates
and, furthermore, such a design can be used to efficiently and
reliably analyze individual differences in susceptibility to the
illusion.
Another question relating to generalizability is whether
expertise modulates the negative footprint illusion. One
hypothesis is that the negative footprint illusion arises because
people who are susceptible to the illusion lack necessary
knowledge of the item’s actual environmental impact, perhaps
in combination with a lack of mathematical skills. Thus, people
who are used to approaching problems with mathematical tools,
and have an understanding of the item’s actual environmental
impact that goes beyond the layperson’s, might be less likely to
fall prey to the influence of the balancing heuristic, and instead
more accurately arrive at the sum of the environmental impact
of the items rather than their average. By definition, experts
often outperform novices (e.g., Ericsson and Lehmann, 1996).
This is typically also the case in the context of judgment and
decision-making (Spence and Brucks, 1997; Kuusela et al., 1998)
and consequently people often trust experts in making high
quality decisions and many let experts make choices for them,
for example allowing them to handle their stock-portfolios and
funds. However, there are cases where training and practice does
not lead to better performance. Research has demonstrated that
recognition based portfolios (i.e., the set of most-recognized
options) outperform portfolios managed by stock-experts
(Ortmann et al., 2008). Correspondingly, there is a large body
of research suggesting that experts are little, if at all, better than
novices at making accurate judgments. For example, experts as
well as novices are susceptible to violations of the conjunction
rule (i.e., A < A+B; Tversky and Kahneman, 1983), and experts
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 May 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 823
fpsyg-09-00823 May 28, 2018 Time: 10:3 # 3
Holmgren et al. Bias in Judgment of Environmental Impact
are good at identifying components necessary for accurate
judgments but are poor at combining those components (Newell
et al., 2015).
The purpose of the present paper was to investigate whether
expertise modulates the magnitude of the negative footprint
illusion. To this end, energy systems graduate students—with
academic degrees in energy-related fields and academic training
in mathematics—were recruited as participants and asked to
estimate the environmental impact of buildings with varying
energy ratings. Thus, “experts” in the current context refers to
people with the necessary knowledge and training in energy
systems engineering and its relationship to environmental
impact. To further explore the generalizability of the negative
footprint illusion, the study was also designed to challenge
the hypothesis that the effect disappears when people are able
to compare the two sets of to-be-estimated objects (i.e., in a
within-participants design). We implemented a new judgmental
dimension. Instead of requesting participants to estimate the
‘carbon footprint’ of the two sets, one set with only conventional
items (A) and another set with an addition of “green” items
(A+B), the participants of the current study were asked how
many trees would be necessary to compensate for the two sets’
greenhouse gas emissions due to energy use. We hypothesized
that the participants would estimate that more trees are necessary
to compensate for a set of conventional buildings (A) in
comparison with a set of conventional and “green” buildings
(A+B), as they would erroneously think that A+ B< A.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
A total of 55 participants (42% women), 22 energy system
graduates (henceforth called experts) and 33 undergraduate
students at the University of Gävle without formal education in
environmental issues or energy engineering (henceforth called
novices) participated in the experiment (mean age = 27.58,
SD = 6.18). The study was conducted in accordance with the
declaration of Helsinki and the ethical guidelines given by the
American Psychological Association. All participants were adults
and participated with informed consent. The participants signed
an information agreement form. The study did not treat sensitive
personal data, did not entail a physical intervention or methods
with the purpose of affecting a research person, the data collection
did not include apparent risk of injury, and no data could or
can be traced to individual persons. Because of this, no external
ethical review was requested for the study reported here in
accordance with Swedish law.
Materials
A questionnaire was used to obtain data. On the first page of
the questionnaire, participants were told that they were about
to make two evaluations and were asked to carefully read the
information before making the evaluations. In one condition,
the participants viewed an abstract representation of a suburb
consisting of 150 ‘conventional’ buildings with appurtenant
energy efficiency ratings, and they were told that all units had
the same materials and performance characteristics. In the other
condition, the participants viewed an identical suburb, with the
exception that another 50 ‘green’ (i.e., environmentally certified)
buildings with appurtenant energy efficiency ratings were also
present (i.e., a total of 200 buildings). For each condition, the
participants were given the following information before making
the evaluation: “Energy use is linked to greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions, which in turn are harmful for the environment. For
example, assume for every unit of electrical energy used and
for every unit of residential heat used, a certain amount of
CO2 is produced. A transportation company based in Örebro,
has introduced an environmental compensation policy, that is,
if one of their cars covers 33,000 km, the company will plant
50 trees. Planted trees absorb CO2 for many years, and can
therefore compensate for the negative environmental consequences
of increased energy use.” They were then asked to estimate how
many trees on a scale from 1 to 100 each suburb needed to
compensate for their monthly energy use. The two conditions
were counterbalanced between participants.
Design and Procedure
A within-between mixed participants design was used with two
independent variables. One independent variable was ‘suburb
type,’ manipulated within participants in two conditions: 150
conventional buildings (henceforth called the ‘conventional
condition’) vs. 150 conventional buildings with an addition
of 50 “green” buildings (henceforth called the ‘green addition
condition’). The order between the two suburb types was
counterbalanced between participants. More specifically, half of
the participants were randomly assigned to begin with the green
addition condition and the other half were assigned to begin
with the conventional condition. The other independent variable
was ‘group type’: 33 participants belonged to the novice group,
whereas 22 participants belonged to the experts group.
RESULTS
As can be seen in Figure 1, both the experts and the novices
reported that fewer trees were needed for the suburb with
‘conventional’ and ‘green’ buildings compared to the condition
with only the ‘conventional’ buildings. This was confirmed by
a 2 (suburb type: conventional condition vs. green addition
condition) × 2 (group type: novices vs. experts) mixed analysis
of variance, which revealed a main effect of suburb type,
F(1,53) = 10.27, p = 0.002, η2p = 0.16. The analysis did not reveal a
significant interaction, F(1,53) = 0.31, p = 0.582, η2p = 0.01, nor a
main effect of group, F(1,53) = 2.97, p = 0.091, η2p = 0.05, showing
that experts and novices responded similarly.
Because this conclusion rests on a null-hypothesis, we also
report the Bayesian factors (BFs) for the effects. The BF01 for
the main effect of suburb type was 0.057, p(H0|D) = 0.053,
p(H1|D) = 0.946, which is regarded as positive evidence of
the alternative hypothesis (Masson, 2011). The BF01 for the
interaction was 6.32, p(H0|D) = 0.863, p(H1|D) = 0.137, positive
evidence for the null hypothesis, and the BF01 for the main
effect of group was 1.01, p(H0|D) = 0.623, p(H1|D) = 0.377, weak
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FIGURE 1 | Experts’ (energy system graduates) and novices’ estimates of how many trees are needed to compensate for the energy use of a community with 150
‘conventional’ buildings and a community with 150 ‘conventional’ and 50 ‘green’ buildings. Estimates appear to be underpinned by an averaging bias by which
people believe that the addition of more ‘environmentally friendly’ objects compensates for the negative impact of less friendly objects. Error bars represent standard
error of means.
evidence for the null hypothesis. The Bayesian analyses reinforce
the conclusion that experts were susceptible to the negative
footprint illusion and to a degree similar to that of novices.
DISCUSSION
The present study shows that when energy-efficient buildings are
added to a set of less energy-efficient buildings, the estimated
environmental impact of the total set is reduced rather than
increased. The results revealed a highly reliable manifestation
of this illusion with no difference between novices and experts.
Because of this, we conclude that people can be susceptible to
the negative footprint illusion even when they have sufficient
mathematical skills and knowledge of the items’ environmental
impact. Moreover, the present study also suggests that the illusion
can survive when people are able to compare the two to-be-
evaluated sets and generalizes to judgment dimensions other
than carbon footprint estimates (Gorissen and Weijters, 2016;
Holmgren et al., 2018).
While level of expertise made no difference to the negative
footprint illusion reported here, it should, however, be mentioned
that there are research domains within which experts indeed
outperform novices at making accurate decisions (Spence and
Brucks, 1997; Kuusela et al., 1998). A group of energy system
graduates were chosen as experts in this particular experiment,
because the estimates they were asked to make concerned
compensation for buildings’ energy use. In contrast to novices,
energy system graduates had expert knowledge of this issue.
Furthermore, this group of ‘graduate students’ should be viewed
as experts in contrast to the group of novices with regards to
buildings energy systems and environmental assessments because
these subjects are extensively covered in the course work of their
graduate program. The ‘experts’ in the current study are not
necessarily representative of energy-system researchers or others
with extensive experience of the energy profession, who perhaps
more justly could be called “true” experts in the field. However,
we conclude that the negative footprint illusion is seemingly
resilient to some levels of expertise, including university training
in mathematics and at least to a basic understanding of the
to-be-estimated objects’ actual environmental impact.
A possible explanation of the negative footprint illusion, based
on previous research (Holmgren et al., 2018), is that the effect is
underpinned by an averaging process. Rather than basing their
estimates of the environmental impact of a category of items on
the sum of A and B (which would be more accurate), people
appear to base their estimates on the average of A and B. The
estimator calculates (probably unconsciously) the average of the
items in the set, whereby the “green” objects in the set contribute
to the average with lower values, whereas the conventional
objects contribute with higher values. The environmental impact
estimate that results from this process follows a principle that can
be expressed as A + B < A, whereby A are conventional items
and B are environmentally friendly items. This erroneous way
of reasoning has been termed “the averaging bias” (Holmgren
et al., 2018) and could be responsible for people’s false belief that
“green” objects actually benefit the environment when in fact they
are simply ‘less bad’ than their conventional counterparts. On this
view, an alternative explanation of the negative footprint illusion
is that participants more simply assess the sum of conventional
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items and “green” items as A – B, where conventional items are
viewed as ‘bad’ for the environment and “green” items as ‘good’
(or beneficial) to the environment. However, past research shows
that people assess “green” items as environmentally harmful, but
to a lesser degree than conventional items, why the averaging
explanation of the negative footprint illusion appears to be more
likely.
Our supposition is that the averaging bias may pervade many
contexts and behavioral settings wherein people explicitly and
implicitly evaluate a mixture of objects and actions, such as
choosing consumer goods and estimating the health of food
products (Chernev and Gal, 2010) and the benefits of emission
cuts (Lewandowsky, 2016). The averaging bias may also underpin
the belief that undertaking environmentally friendly actions can
compensate for less friendly ones (Kaklamanou et al., 2015).
Applied Implications
This study – which suggests that the illusion manifests
also when people are able to compare the two to-be-
evaluated sets – strengthens the case that this effect can have
negative consequences for the environment when people make
environment-related decisions. For example, consumers may
choose to purchase eco-labeled food products as a way to
compensate for buying conventional products, with the intention
to decrease the environmental impact of their consumer behavior,
when they are – in fact – increasing the burden by adding more
products regardless of the eco-label. This stresses the need to find
methods that can limit the tendency to base impact estimates on
the average of conventional products and “green” products (?).
Another real world situation in which the negative footprint
illusion can have negative consequences for the environment
concerns management decision-making, for example in the
context of urban planning. If experts within disciplines that have
a direct influence on environmental management – implicitly or
explicitly – think “green” buildings have the ability to decrease
the carbon footprint of a community (as this study suggests),
then it is essential to reconsider how “green” buildings are
portrayed in various discourses. The way that “green” buildings
appear to be represented in people’s minds at present could lead
decision makers and policy makers to promote the construction
of “green” buildings for the wrong reasons, believing that the
“green” buildings will reduce the environmental burden of a
community rather than adding further to it.
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